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THE SLACKENING OF ECONOMIC DYNAMISM AND THE 
INTENSIFICATION OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS 
A. EVOLUTION OF THE ECONOMY: ITS INSTABILITY AND THE 
SHARP DECLINE IN THE RATE OF GROWTH 
The International Development Strategy (IDS) sanctioned by the General Assembly 
of the United Nations and the Regional Programme of Action adopted by CEPAL at its 
last session in the framework of that strategy were designed to provide guidelines 
for the action that should be taken at the national, regional and international 
levels in order to promote during the 1980s the development of the peripheral 
countries in general and of Latin America in particular. The implementation of 
IDS depended upon concerted acticn in the international, regional and national 
fields conducive to the adoption of decisions intended to eliminate or mitigate 
structural situations in the world economy -particularly in the industrial countries-
which represent obstacles to the practical application of the Strategy. Unfortu-
nately, the developments that were bred and propagated by the world economic crisis 
generated new political and economic situations which drove events along a course 
essentially different from the basic premises and guiding principles propounded by 
the International Development Strategy and CEPAL's Regional Programme of Action. 
No progress whatever has been made in concerting the global negotiations 
that had been envisaged for the structuring of a new international economic order, 
and the first year of the present decade and as much of this second year as has 
elapsed display in the international sphere a panorama of profound economic 
recession, with high indexes of unemployment and inflation, and at the regional 
level of our own countries a severe deterioration in economic and social conditions. 
If the region is considered as a whole, it can be seen that the per capita 
domestic product in 1981 failed to maintain its 1980 levels, real per capita income 
declined, and the results expected for 1982 are yet more unfavourable. 
International events and the aforesaid deterioration of economic and social 
conditions are tending to propagate a dangerous climate of instability and confusion 
in the context of which substantial changes in national policies are often brought 
about in many countries, in an endeavour to control almost unmanageable situations. 
/These processes 
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These processes have indubitably been influenced by factors of different 
kinds, both internal and external, which differ from one country to another. Among 
the former may be mentioned policies of greater or lesser.openness; the scale and 
terms of the use of external financial resources; the protection or non-protection 
of national economic activities; the placing, of emphasis oh certain economic and 
political objectives to the detriment of others of a socio-economic character which 
are of special significance; the modus operandi and degree of efficacy in the 
administration of reserves and of the external debt; and over-estimation of the 
soundness of specific policies in the light of experiences which were apparently 
satisfactory over the short term, but were really -in part at least- the result of 
the favourable evolution of other factors. Generally speaking, it seems that in 
many cases domestic policies prevailed which were based on a diagnosis of the 
situation aid an evaluation of international trends which with the passage of time 
became more and more widely divorced from reality. 
Obviously, however, it has been the changes and unfavourable trends in 
external variables stemming from the policies pursued and the stagnation and 
inflation faced by the industrial countries, as well as from the world economic 
recession, that have made for a tight bottleneck.in the economic growth of the 
great majority of the countries of the region and for an atmosphere of uncertainty 
as regards their subsequent development. The factors in question can be controlled 
by the developing countries only in part and in certain respects, and their 
influence determines a high degree of economic and technological dependence upon 
the industrial countries. 
Many Latin American countries contracted debts on the assumption that the 
crisis in the developed world was basically of a conjunctural nature. . During the 
second half of the 1970s they managed, by means of borrowing and a rapid expansion 
of exports, .to maintain what in the circumstances under which.the world economy was 
labouring appeared a relatively high rate of economic growth, until the persistence 
and aggravation of the external crisis made their economic policy models untenable. 
The problems of external indebtedness and financing besetting ropst of the 
Latin American countries and their effects on the decline in growth are not a crop 
of yesterday's sowing; they are really the result of institutional changes and of 
a cumulative process that began midway through the 1970s. To shed light on these 
aspects of the question and gain a more precise idea of the nature of the prevailing 
/economic and 
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economic and financial situations it is desirable to review, if only succinctly 
and in broad outline, the various phases that have been occurring. 
With this end in view, and for the sake of simplicity, in the evolution of 
the region's economy, from the beginning of the past decade up to the present time, 
four periods or phases might be considered which reflect changes and trends of a 
general character, albeit not always exactly applicable or significant for each and 
every country. These phases correspond to the following periods: (i) the period of 
intense dynamism recorded in the early 1970s; last decade; (ii) the period 1974-1975, 
marked by changes in the direction of an economic depression which became more 
pronounced in the latter year; (iii) the moderate and costly recovery which extended 
from 1976 to 1980; and, lastly,(iv) the economic and financial crisis of 1981 which 
is stretching over into 1982, and which, unfortunately, may likewise prevail in 
1983. Thus the period is clearly one of sharp contrasts, in which the optimism of 
the early 1970s seems to have influenced the maintenance -if not the accentuation-
of patterns of external trade and financing whose non-viability has become evident 
at the dawn of the 1980s, when hard facts are finally spreading an attitude of 
pessimism. 
The early 1970s -up to 1974 in certain respects- witnessed the culmination of 
a phase of rapid economic growth which had started in the second half of the 1960s, 
although with notable differences from one country to another. 
Up to 1973, a boom in exports of goods and services occurred in the great 
majority of the countries of the region, and for many of them the external terms 
of trade followed a favourable trend, thus strengthening the purchasing power of 
their exports. Accordingly, imports expanded appreciably, on a scale exceeding the 
increment in the domestic product, without thereby causing any significant increase 
in balance-of-payments deficits on current account, at any rate for the region as 
a whole. 
The year 1974 marked a phase of transition from the boom of the preceding 
years to a definite depression in 1975. This transition has one noteworthy feature. 
The growth rate of the product remained relatively high and the petroleum-exporting 
countries increased their real income by virtue of the rise in the price of their 
exports. Imports, in their turn, expanded considerably in almost all countries; 
but at the same time, in an important group of countries exports remained static 
or decreased and the external terms of trade deteriorated in almost all the 
/non-petroleum 
non-petroleum-exporting countries. Thus the real value of these countries' exports 
of goods and services contracted. In 1975 the economic recession became general; 
for the non-petroleum-exporting countries as a whole exports continued to stagnate, 
and their terms of trade deteriorated considerably, the result being a pronounced 
reduction in the real value of exports which affected the petroleum-exporting coun-
tries as well. In this setting the rate of economic growth dropped to only 3.5%, 
and imports dwindled, except in the petroleum-exporting countries. 
In these circumstances, in 1974 the non-petroleum-exporting countries as a 
whole appreciably enlarged their balance-of-payments deficit on current account, 
which, in the case of a group of 20 countries,!./ climbed from approximately M- 500 
million dollars in 1978 to 13 500 million in 1974. The main causes were the expansion 
of imports and the decrease in the real value of exports. This swollen deficit was 
partly financed by the use of reserves, but principally by an increase in external 
borrowing. In 1975 the increment in the deficit was still bigger; for the same 
group of countries it reached a figure of approximately 16 200 million dollars, at 
current prices, which seems to have been determined by the contraction again 
recorded in the real value of exports, and this notwithstanding the decrease in the 
value of imports and the decline in the rate of economic growth. Thus, in a brief 
period the proportion of the value of exports represented by net external financing 
rose from 19% to 51%. International reserves were again reduced, but the bulk of 
the financing contributed to the accumulation of a huge external debt, which -in 
default of the restoration of conditions in respect of economic dynamism and the 
terms of trade similar to those of the early 1970s- had subsequent effects on the 
rate of economic growth and on national measures of economic policy. 
The phase covered by the years 1976-1979 may be described as one of merely 
moderate recovery, especially if it is taken into account that the average annual 
growth rate of the domestic product attained only a little over 5%. 
Noteworthy features of this phase were the vigorous expansion of exports and 
the maintenance of a considerable flow of external financing, notwithstanding the 
high levels of previous borrowing. This facilitated an increase in imports, which, 
nevertheless, was less than the rise in the real value of exports. Although for the 
group of 20 countries under consideration the balance-of-payments deficit on current 
1/ Comprising all the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, with the 
exclusion of Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela. 
/account decreased 
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account decreased in relation to the peak figure of 1975, the imbalance remained at 
relatively high levels, and throughout this period the external indebtedness of the 
countries of the region continued to increase. IThat is more, in 1979 there was a 
further rise in the deficit, which, for the same group of countries, mounted from 
approximately 11 600 million dollars in 1978 to 19 100 million in 1979.2/ 
Economic development in 1980 differs greatly from one country to another. 
Thus, for example, Mexico gradually increased the economic weight it carried among 
the countries of the region while at the same time acquiring special characteristics 
as a result of the growing importance of its production and exports of petroleum. 
Broadly speaking, the economic growth rate for the countries as a whole may be 
described as resembling or slightly exceeding the average for the period 1975-1979; 
although in many countries the high rate of increase in the volume of exports was 
maintaired, signs of deterioration began to appear, downswings occurring in some 
countries, while the terms of trade worsened in most cases, the petroleum-exporting 
countries excepted. The reduction in imports observed in a few instances was more 
than offset by the sizeable increments in others. Furthermore, the effects of 
previous external borrowing began to make themselves felt. Profits and interest on 
foreign capital and the external debt increased considerably, and the net figures 
reached some 13 300 million dollars in 1979, rising to 18 100 million in 1980. These 
figures were influenced not only by the increase in the debt but also by the rise 
in rates of interest. 
Accordingly, the balance-of-payments deficit on current account for the 
20 countries under discussion soared from 19 100 million dollars in 1979 to 
32 400 million in 1980. It should be added that the other countries defined as the 
petroleum-exporting group also witnessed an increase in the current deficit on their 
external accounts. 
In 1981, despite a renewed expansion of the volume of exports of the group 
of non-petroleum-exporting countries, the signs of deterioration that had appeared 
in 1980 spread more widely, sales abroad contracted in a larger number of countries, 
and there was a tendency for the deterioration in the external terms of trade to 
be generalized. Thus the real value of exports increased only slightly, and still 
2f All these figures are expressed in current values. If they were adjusted 
in terms of constant prices of any previous year, the absolute increase would be 
less, in consequence of the rise in the prices of goods and services marketed. 
/less if 
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less if the petroleum-exporting countries are taken into account, with the exception 
of Mexico, where a markedly favourable trend was observable. In terms of real 
value this country's exports increased by more than 15%, a fact which highlights 
the importance that petroleum exports are acquiring in Mexico's total external sales. 
Imports decreased in many countries and the region's gross domestic product rose by 
only 1.5%, an increment much smaller than that of its population. 
In this situation the group of 20 countries still under review once again 
showed a significant upswing in the deficit on their external current accounts, 
which mounted from 32 400 million dollars in 1980 to 41 900 million in 1981. This 
increase of somewhat over 9 000 million dollars was virtually due to the net flows 
of profits and interest on external investment and debt, which climbed from 18 100 
million dollars to 27 100 million. This meant that during 1981 the deficit on the 
trade balance was contained,' and the increase in external financing was absorbed' 
by the payment of profits and interest. Such is the interpretation that can be 
inferred from the aggregate figures, since experience may vary as regards the 
individual evolution of each of the countries of the region. 
The nature of this evolution does not change if attention is turned to the 
group of 24 countries in the region on which balance-of-paymerits information is 
available. The total balance on current account rose from 28 100 million dollars 
to 33 500 million, and net profits and interest paid ¿broad' increased from 18 900 
million dollars to 29 800 million. 
B. SOME SALIENT ASPECTS OF TOE DEVELOPMENT 
PROBLEMS FACING THE REGION 
The brief review presented in the foregoing section may usefully be followed 
by a synthesis, still on the macroeconomic level, of the most salient internal 
and external aspects of the problems facing the region in present conditions. 
These aspects relate , to economic dynamism, the problems of the external bottleneck 
and the intensification of, social problems and pressures. 
The moderate economic dynamism which the region had been displaying since 
1976, to some extent as a recovery from.the 1975 recession, went to pieces in 1981 
and the economy sank into a severe depression which up to now has been extended and 
aggravated in 1982. In 1981 the rate of increase of the domestic product was 
little more than 1%, definitely below the growth rate of the population, and thus 
the per capita product of the region as a whole diminished for the first time in 
the whole of the post-war period. 
/This deterioration 
- 7 -
This deterioration was influenced by both internal and external factors. The 
former are linked to national policies which in some situations have proved 
inadequate and in others have intensified the negative effects of the present 
conjuncture and the world economic recession. Nevertheless, it is evident that in 
the context of the current functioning of the national economies, it is the external 
factors that appear as the most conspicuous determinants, in one direction or 
another, of the essential features characterizing the evolution of the Latin American 
countries. 
Stagnation and inflation in the industrial countries and the world economic 
recession have simultaneously engendered negative effects on trade and external 
financing, thus disrupting the trends followed in the 1970s, when trade crises 
were less acute and could be weathered by making extensive use of external financing. 
Countries have been facing at one and the same time a contraction in the volumes of 
demand, a deterioration of the terms of trade, a rise in real interest rates, a 
fall in the supply of external financing and a notable increase in protectionism. 
By the end of 1981 and the beginning of 1982 a conjuncture could be discerned in 
which the following facts coincide: 
(a) The external demand of the industrial countries slackened in consequence 
of the stagnation and contraction of their rate of growth; albeit many Latin Americar 
countries did manage, except in the recession years, to secure an appreciable 
increase in the volume of their exports through the operation of other factors and 
the diversification of markets, as is discussed later; 
Cb) Primary commodity prices fell, in nominal or real terms, owing to the 
above-mentioned slackening of international demand and in some cases to the 
liquidation of inventories because of the high rates of interest; 
(c) The persistent inflation observable in the industrial countries, even 
though some of them are succeeding in reducing it, has brought about a deterioration 
in the terms of trade for the countries of the region in their commerce with the 
industrial countries. Simultaneously, in some cases, there has been a decrease in 
the foreign currency prices of certain Latin American export items which has been 
caused by devaluations and other measures to gain a footing and favourable 
competitive conditions in the industrial countries' markets. This trend towards 
a deterioration in the terms of trade has sharpened with the rise of petroleum 
t < 
prices for the petroleum-importing countries, especially in the years in which 
changes in those prices have taken place; /(d) The 
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(d) The rise in interest rates has considerably increased the cost of the 
external debt that has been accumulating as a result of the heavy balance-of-payments 
deficits. In this respect a stage has been reached at which the increments in 
balance-of-paytnents deficits on current account are being determined by the excep-
tional increases noted in net profits and interest on external investment and 
indebtedness. These results are observable in some individual countries, and in 
the movement of the figures for the region as a whole; 
(e) The restrictive policies prevailing in the industrial countries have 
helped to underline these countries1 postulates to the effect that international 
co-operation and external aid should be granted in accordance with a principle of 
graduality or of discrimination between the developing countries. The same thing 
is. advocated :for .special or preferential treatment in respect of trade and other 
matters* Thus, almost all the latin American countries would be excluded from 
treatment.of this kind, which would be reserved for the lower-income countries; 
(f) There is a reqrudescence of proposals and concrete decisions relating to 
the adoption of protectionist measures in industrial countries with the aim of 
preventing or limiting the access of Latin American countries to the markets for 
manufactures or semi-manufactures which are of particular interest to Latin America. 
Despite the decline in the rate of economic growth and the measures adopted 
in manyi Latin American countries to contain or reduce.the volume of imports, balance-
of-payments deficits on current account have risen considerably,.especially in the 
last few years, and in this way an accumulative prooess has been generated which 
is bringing external indebtedness to dangerous levels and situations. This state 
of affairs creates a veritable bottleneck which is preventing the recovery and 
acceleration of economic dynamism and,a more stable eyolution than that exhibited 
in recent years. .In point of fact: • , 
(a) The balance-of-payments deficits on current account of the region as a 
wholes which -as. stated above- had been increasing significantly, have doubled in 
thelast two.years. They rose from 19.800 million d o l l a r s in 1979 to 38 600 
million in 1981. In relation to the domestic product the deficits in question 
showed the highest indexes in the whole of the post-war period, in almost all 
countries. Thus, for example, in the,majority of countries the balance-of-payments 
deficits on current account:came to represent between 60% and 12.0% of the gross 
domestic product. Prior to the depression, at the beginning of the decade, the 
corresponding figures ranged only from 0.5 to 0.6%. 
7(b) The ' V 
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(b) The relation between net external financing and earnings from exports of 
goods and services has appreciably increased, reaching between 25 and 88% in the 
year 1981 in most countries; 
(c) A feature which has been gaining in importance since the mid-1970s 
relates to the fact that external financing funds are increasingly provided by the 
international private banking system, on bvirdensome terras and conditions, particu-
larly in respect of loan repayment periods and high rates of interest; 
(d) The aggregate increase in profits and interest on external investment 
and debt is surprising. In the majority of countries these payments represented 
from 3.5 to 7.0% of the domestic product in the year 1981, whereas in the early 
1970s the corresponding index was only 1.6%; 
(e) This is due to the stepping-up of interest rates and the persistent 
increase in the external debt. The latter reached a sum of about 250 000 million 
dollars at the end of 1981, whereas only two years before, at the end of 1979, it 
had amounted to 170 000 million dollars. This debt is concentrated in a small 
number of large and medium-sized countries, but the debt accumulated by other 
medium-sized and small countries is also of particular relative importance; 
(f) Another especially significant aspect of the problem is the effect of 
the deterioration in the national economies' terms of trade. If the benchmark 
adopted is the year 1975, by which time the increases in petroleum prices registered 
in 1973-1974 were already incorporated, the terms-of-trade effect came to represent 
a loss of 1,9% of the gross domestic product in many non-petroleum-exporting 
countries; 
(g) In these circumstances, the adverse effect on the purchasing power or 
real value of exports of goods and services was very considerable. This would 
seem to indicate that, for some countries at least, the impact of the deterioration 
in the terms of trade and the swelling external profits and interest were factors 
carrying special weight in the balance-of-payments problems and the decline in the 
rate of growth. 
The fall in the economic growth rate and the crisis which is affecting most 
of the countries of the region have immediate consequences in the shape of a 
worsening of social conditions for a great mass of the population. This is 
evidenced in the increase in unemployment and underemployment, in the decrease in 
real wages, in the persistence and accentuation of extreme inequality in income 
/distribution, and 
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distribution, and in the maintenance of situations of extremé poverty arid indigence 
by which a high proportion of the population is afflicted. It should be taken into 
account that in boom periods, or in times of greater economic dynamism, income or 
the fruits of economic growth are distributed very unequally and employment levels 
do not rise to the extent desirable. In phases of slow growth or economic crisis 
it is the lowers income sectors that are hardest hit by the adverse effects of this 
trend in the national economies. It is explicable, therefore, that in the framework 
of extremely inequitablé societies like those of Latin America, social pressures 
are intensified and the factors making for instability increase. 
C. THE INTENSIFICATION OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND TENSIONS 
In the report prepared by the Secretariat for the most recent meeting of 
CEGAN, which contained the Regional Programme of Action to,facilitate the appli-
cation of the International Development Strategy, consideration was given to 
various aspects of economic grotfth, social change, social distribution ,of .income, 
the scale and .extent of poverty and the problems of uneïïployment.3/ 
It was stated in the report that Latin America had obviously .undergone a very 
important and meaningful process-of. economic growth and social, change since the war; 
but it was no.less true, as the report immediately went, on to.add, that the.nature 
of that process.had led and still was leading to the shaping of highly inequitable, 
societies. The most salient features of the development process prevailing in the 
region are revealed in a socio-economic structure which is characterized by a very 
high degree of concentration of wealth and national income in small segments, of the 
pop illation, a great mass of'the population living in conditions; of extreme poverty, 
and a frequently rapid escansión of the middle social strata. ,. 
The factors, determining these structures or inherent therein are related, in 
essence with the ccncentrative forces of the prevailing economic system, with ... 
private appropriation of the surplus , with the degree in which the latte.r is used 
to boost non-essential consumption in a process of incessant diversification, and 
with consumptive investment. 
3/'Latin American Development in the 1980s, E/CEPAL/G.1150; E/CEPAL/CEGAN 5/, , 
L.3; April 1981. 
/At tfie ' 
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At the beginning of the 1980s the Latin American governments stressed in the 
Regional Programme of Action the imbalance between economic and social progress. 
"Latin America has undergone a significant process of economic growth and social 
change since the war, but the nature of that process has led and still leads to the 
shaping of highly inequitable societies."^/ The rise in unemployment and the fall 
in real wages which are more and more in evidence in the Latin American countries at 
the present conjuncture give reason to apprehend a deterioration in the situation of 
the more disadvantaged groups. In these circumstances, it becomes necessary to 
reaffirm the guiding principles of social development contained in the Regional 
Programme of Action and to adopt measures intended to redistribute the cost of the 
crisis and to strengthen strategies designed to "increase production capacity, so 
that the structures of production and consumption can be transformed in order to 
meet the basic aspirations of the majorities for a better life".5/ 
4/ See "Regional Programme of Action for Latin America in the 1980s", in 
Economic and Social Council Official Records, 1981, Supplement No. 16, Report of 
the nineteenth session of CEP AL (E/CEPAL/G.1176), May 1981, p. 204, paragraph 12. 
5/ Ibid., p. 215, paragraph 60. 
/Chapter II 
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• Chapter II ; 
. ;THE ECONOMIC PROGRESS, INDEBTEDNESS AND CHANGES XiT EXTERNAL 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
A. INTERRELATIONS BETWEEN EXTERNAL FACTORS. AND THE 
NATIONAL ECONOMIC PROCESS ' 
Industrial development, progress in the field of training, the expansion of 
production capacity and the changes in production and technology that have taken 
place in.most of the Latin American countries since the Second World War might have 
been expected to reduce , at least in the .large countries and in some of those of 
medium size, the degree of sensitiveness, vulnerability and dependence of national 
economies in relation;to the action of external factors, particularly as regards the 
unfavourable effects and repercussions of the world economic recession and economic 
and technological trends in the industrial countries with which Latin America 
maintains the bulk of its economic and financial relations. And all this in view, 
above all, of the significant progress that has been made in the development of the 
productive forces of the national economies. 
It is true that obviously, to a lesser degree, the countries of the region 
possess a capacity and a radius of government action of wider scope than in the past* 
as well as sounder infrastructure and support bases to defend themselves against the 
unfavourable impact of external factors. Host of the countries are clearly in a 
better position than at earlier stages, when specialization in primary production 
predominated in domestic activities and in exports; and better, too, than in the 
early phases of the industrialization processes. 
It is no less obvious, hovrever, that in the context of the Latin American 
countries'present insertion in the world economy and, in particular, of their 
relations to the economic and technological evolution of the industrial countries, 
the national economies are markedly sensitive, in one way or another, to external 
events, and display a high degree of vulnerability and structural dependence. And . 
the area of the favourable or unfavourable effects and repercussions of external 
variables has been broadened by the application of more liberal policies, 
characterized by -the increasing external openness which the countries have been 
promoting, although with great differences from one country to another in respect 
of the nature and scale of the openness of government attitudes and initiatives 
vis-a-vis external events. 
/In other 
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In other words, there can be no doubt that as has already been said, the growth 
and the far-reaching economic, social and technological changes which have taken 
place since the Second World War have appreciably strengthened the economic , capacity 
of the countries of the region and have broadened the area of government action, 
advances that might be regarded as the conquest of a measure of autonomy. But there 
is no getting away from the conclusion that a new vulnerability and a new dependence 
have been shaped, more complex and diversified than in the past3 which in some 
respects may be considered to produce wider and profounder relative effects. Let a 
little thought be given, for example, to the risk and possible consequences of the 
financial situations of indebtedness and balance-of-payments deficits5 as regards the 
vulnerability and dependence of the Latin American economies in relation to the power 
exercised at the present time by the international private banking system and world 
financial institutions. 
One global aspect worthy of mention is the marked parallelism during the 1970s 
between the evolution of economic growth rates in the industrial countries and in 
the Latin American countries as a whole. In contrast, the biennium 1981-1982 is 
witnessing a disruption of a parallelism that had been characterized by the higher 
levels of Latin Americans growth rates, and it is therefore especially important 
to describe these phenomena in depth. The growth rates of the gross domestic product 
of the seven largest industrial countries show a movement through time whose periods 
or phases are distinctly similar to those identified in the preceding chapter in the 
context of the evolution of the annual growth rates of the gross domestic product for 
Latin America as a whole. Thus, in broad outline, the following points may be 
stressed: (a) the industrial countries reached the culmination of a long period of 
rapid economic growth in the year 1973, when the product increased by more than 6% 
in relation to the preceding year; while at the same time Latin America prolonged its 
intense economic dynamism until 1974, in which year the gross domestic product rose 
by approximately 7%, with a heavy balance-of-payments deficit on current accountj 
(b) the crisis loomed up in Latin America in the year 1974, when the growth rate 
was a little over 3.5%, while the industrial countries lapsed into a state of 
stagnation or economic recession in 1974-1975; (c) in 1975-1980 a moderate recovery 
took place, with an average growth rate of 5.5% in Latin America. In the industrial 
countries too there was a temporary recovery in economic growth, whose quantitative 
evolution is expressed in an increase of 5.2% in 1976 and an uninterrupted slide-
down to 3.7% in 1979; (d) in the biennium 1980-1981 this decline sharpened in 
/the industrial 
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the industrial countries,, whose, average annual growth rate was only a little more 
than 1%, while in Latin America the downward movement took place in 1981 with a 
variation in the region's gross .domestic product very similar in scale to that 
recorded in the industrial countries;, and (e) for the present year (1982) a. 
contraction -possibly of some significance- in the domestic product of the region as 
a whole and stagnation in the industrial countries are expected. 
In the context of these trends in the economic growth rates of Latin America 
and of the industrial countries- it is useful to point out three clearly 
distinguishable aspects. One is the fact that during the 1970s the economic growth 
of the region as a whole was always kept at higher average levels than that of the 
industrial countries, and only in 1981 was an increase witnessed of very similar 
magnitude in the two areas and of slight relative significance. For 1982, a 
contraction in Latin America's gross domestic product is expected: on the contrary, 
in the industrial countries taken as a whole the economy is. likely to remain 
virtually stagnant. Another feature is that the periods of stagnation, of 
depression or of little economic growth were of longer (one or two years') duration 
in the industrial countries than in Latin America. Mow, however, the region will be 
completing two years of stagnation. And, lastly, the third general observation to 
be made is that both in the seventies and today the years of scanty growth or 
contraction occur in the context of a fall or decline of the real value of exports, 
resulting from a combination of. the evolution of exports in terms of constant prices 
and the variations in the terms of trade. But in the latter period there has also 
been a considerable increase in the relative importance of debt servicing. 
No claim is made that from these comparisons it is possible to derive a precise 
definition of the quantitative relation between the economic growth rates of our 
region and the evolution of the industrial countries; and still less to explain the 
inverse relation. And this not only because of the heterogeneity of the two 
aggregates, but, essentially, because economic and financial relations are more 
complex and diversified than could be inferred from such a comparison between the . 
global growth rates; and, furthermore, for the very important reason that the 
economic strategies and policies which have prevailed.in the industrial countries 
and in Latin America play a supremely important part in the nature and magnitude of 
the effects and repercussions on trends in Latin America that may be produced by 
the operation of the industrial economies and the world economic recession. 
/Nevertheless, this 
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Nevertheless, this global comparative analysis -the results of which have been 
synthesized in the foregoing paragraphs- sheds a great deal of light on the position 
of the two areas in the dynamic context of the world economy and poses several 
questions as to the vulnerability and pronounced sensitiveness to external variables 
displayed by the Latin American economic process. The following paragraphs will 
pursue this topic farther. 
To make headway in the present study a selection has been made of the principal 
macro-economic variables that are generally incorporated in global economic projection 
models, and their historical evolution since 1950 has been examined, with special 
and more detailed attention to the period extending from the most recent years of the 
past decade up to the present time. These variables are the following: (a) the gross 
domestic product; (b) real national income.- (c) effects of the variation in the terms 
of trade; (d) net external financing, which is conventionally considered equivalent 
to the balance-of-payments deficit on current account; (e) exports of goods and 
services; (f) imports of goods and services; (g) profits and interest on external 
investment and debt; (h) public and private consumption; (i) gross domestic investment 
including inventory variations*, (j) ex-post domestic saving, which, according to 
the conventional definitions, is equivalent to the surplus of real national income 
over total private and public consumption. 
Obviously, an analysis of the interrelationships between these variables and 
those corresponding to external factors must be based on each individual country's 
experience, since, inter alia, national economic policies have not been uniform, and 
the evolution of the variables in question has also differed from one country to 
another; so has the operation of the respective national economies. Moreover, 
considerable influence is exerted by other well-known factors, such as economic and 
demographic size and,the stage of development through which the various countries 
are passing. In this analysis, yet more than in others« the aggregation of countries 
incurs the risk of concealing precisely what one wants to know3 that is, the specific 
experience stemming from the different economic policies that countries have adopted. 
Consequently, in this part of the document general observations will be 
formulated, and in the following section comments will be made with respect to 
specific countries which have been selected with a view to the desirability of taking 
into account dissimilar national experiences. The essential aim of this analysis is 
solely to describe the course followed by the process, not to evaluate the policy 
pursued in each of the countries in question. For that purpose further information 
and other background material would be required. 
/The information 
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The information and background material supplied by the research conducted 
bears on various essential aspects of the operation of the national economies in 
relation to external variables. The following are among the features to which allusion 
should be made: (i) relations between the domestic product and real national income; 
(ii) the degree of sensitiveness, vulnerability and' dependence of national economies 
with respect to external factors; (iii) the borrowing process and trends in total 
domestic investment and consumption; (iv) the nature of the external bottleneck. This 
part of the analysis suffers from certain limitations inasmuch as it does not take 
into consideration other aspects of special importance, such as those relating to the 
countries' economic policies arid in particular their trade policies: to living 
conditions: to the displacement of production technologies and to the participation 
of transnational enterprises. 
The decline in the growth rate of the domestic product during recent years has 
been accompanied by a considerable increase in payments of profits and interest on 
external investment and debt, and in many cases by losses in the purchasing power 
of exports attributable to the deterioration of the terms of trade. The substantial 
rise in external profits and interest is due to two factors: one is the larger scale 
of borrowing and the other is the marked upswing in interest rates. In this 
connection it is illustrative to point out that in a group of sixteen countries, which 
does not include Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela, net payments of profits and interest 
represented in 1981 3.6% of the gross domestic product, whereas, in the 1950s and 1960s 
the corresponding percentage was not as much as 1.5%. 
The significance of the amount of such payments becomes more clearly apparent 
if it is taken into account that the proportion of gross domestic investment they 
represented was as high as 15%. There are many countries for which the relative 
importance of these transfers was still greater than for the sixteen countries as 
a whole. These relations, because of the substantial changes that have taken place 
in them, are in marked contrast to those prevailing in the early 1970s. If, moreover, 
the effect of the deterioration in the terms of trade is superadded, an even higher 
figure would be reached which may be interpreted as a major erosion of the gross 
domestic product of many non-petroleum-exporting countries; since to determine real 
national income both the concepts under discussion must be deducted from the 
domestic product. According to one estimate of what the terms-of-trade effect plus 
payments of profits and interest will have signified in 1981, the gross domestic 
product will have decreased by 5.5% for a group of 15 non-petroleum-exporting 
/countries, excluding 
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countries, excluding Mexico and taking 1975 as the base year for the terms of trade. 
This reduction represents one-fourth of the amount of those countries' gross 
domestic investment. 
In chapter I a description was given of the evolution of the economic growth 
rate of the countries of the region and the course simultaneously followed by some 
external variables, and, in the preceding paragraphs, an attempt was made to outline 
the similarity between the evolution of the annual economic growth rate of the region 
as a whole and the growth rates of the domestic product for the group constituted 
by the seven largest industrial countries. With respect to this latter piece of 
research, it is very important to recall that while throughout the whole of the 1970: 
the average level of Latin America's economic growth rate stood higher than the 
annual growth rates of the domestic product of the industrial countries, in 1981, 
for the first time, Latin America showed a growth rate of little significance which 
virtually coincided with that of the industrial countries; while for 1982 a contrac 
tion in the absolute levels of Latin America;s domestic product is anticipated, just 
when the industrial countries, taken as a whole, will be experiencing a positive 
evolution, although on a very modest scale. These recent trends are yet another 
indication of the depth of the crisis that is affecting the region. 
Generally speaking.., and with particular reference to the non-petroleum-export-
ing countries of Latin America, the interrelationships betvreen external factors and 
rate of economic growth might be synthetized in accordance with the same periods that 
were used in describing the global evolution of the economy in chapter I. 
(a) In the early 1970s the marked dynamism of economic growth was spurred by 
a deliberate national policy of growth which was reinforced by an expansion of 
exports and a simultaneous improvement in the terms of trade. 
(b) In the biennium 1974-1975 exports of goods and services remained static 
and the terms of trade considerably deteriorated. These unfavourable factors made 
their influence felt in 1975 and the economic growth rate was relatively low in 
comparison with that corresponding to the preceding period. The countries tried to 
keep their growth rates up to a certain level and resorted to external borrowing 
and partly to their reserves to cope with the balance-of-payments deficit. A policy 
was thus initiated which attempted to maintain a fairly dynamic economic process 
on the basis of external loans, access to which was relatively easy because of the 
/expansion of 
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expansion of. available international resources generated by the balance-of-payments 
surpluses of the petroleum-exporting countries. 
(c) During the period of moderate recovery which extended up to the end of the 
1970s, the economic scene was characterized by the following features: . 
. (i) a deliberate export promotion policy was pursued, export growth rates 
. were high,'but, at the same time, external borrowing to finance the 
balance-of-payments deficits continued to increase, especially in the 
later years of the period; 
(ii) the servicing of this debt ultimately proved to be very difficult to 
absorb, especially in view of the rise in interest rates- • 
(iii) the .deterioration of the terms of trade, did considerable harm to many 
countries of the region? and 
(iv) payments of interest and profits increased, representing growing 
proportions of the domestic product in almost all the countries of 
the region. , • 
(d) In 1981 and 1982 this economic and financial process has reached a crisis: 
the most characteristic features of the existing situation are essentially the 
following: . 
(i) difficulties in continuing to step up external borrowing:,, 
(ii) a considerable increase .in debt services, which represent very high 
proportions of current export earnings; and . 
(iii) unfavourable prospects for export expansion owing to the prolongation 
• of the crisis in the industrial countries and at the world level. 
These aspects of the interrelationships.between external, factors and the 
national economic process might be considered, in part at leasty of a conjunctural 
character. But the key. question of the vulnerability and dependence, of the rate of 
economic growth is essentially a matter of the asymmetry in the economic and 
technological structure of domestic production and of the trade flows between 
developing an.d industrial countries. 
In reality, the Latin American countries, despite the progress made in the 
economic and technological diversification of their domestic production and of their 
sales abroad, are exporters of primary commodities with differing degrees of 
processing and of manufactures with a low.technological content; whereas their 
imports from the industrial countries comprise intermediate products that are 
/essential for 
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essential for economic activity and capital goods required for the establishment of 
basic infrastructure and for capital accumulation to increase production capacity 
and make headway in the incorporation of technological innovations. In these 
circumstances9 when the capacity to import is reduced, and taking into account the 
policy resolved upon in relation to external financing and the terms for its use, 
national economic policy is confronted with several independent or complementary 
options, namely: 
(a) promotion of a decline in domestic demand in order to reduce imports, whicl 
as is common knowledge, has a high social cost in terms of employment and income 
distribution, besides the fact that such a policy may take a long time to produce 
c 
the results hoped for; 
(b) containment or selective control of imports to limit purchases of non-
essential goods from outside, to which end the adoption of specific policies and 
measures is necessary; 
(c) deliberate policies to promote a greater expansion and diversification of 
exports, although they may have no immediate effect of much significance; and, 
lastly3 
(d) promotion of an efficient industrialization policy, which, of course, 
transcends a short-term conjunctural problem and is identified with the basic and 
essential aspects of the national economy's development strategy and economic and 
technological transformation. 
Over the short term, and especially when there is no significant margin of 
compressible imports, economic policy generally tries to avoid a contraction in 
supplies of imported intermediate products in order not to affect the level of 
economic activity and employment; and this would mean applying restrictions to 
imports of capital goods, which, in their turn, would affect the formation of 
production capacity for the immediate future. 
Another topic of special relevance for conceptual propositions on development 
strategy and for the praxis of economic policy is the analysis of the relative 
changes that might take place in the course followed by domestic investment and total 
consumption, when variations occur in external financing, which in these analyses 
may be considered as the contribution of external resources to the formation of 
the total mass of available goods and services. 
/In this 
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In this connection, it is worth clarifying the point that the amounts of 
external financing tend to be absorbed, at least to a large extent, by remittances 
of external profits and interest (although this situation varies from one country 
to another), and that in these circumstances external transactions, despite the 
swollen balance-of-payments deficits, do not make any real contribution to the 
total supply of available goods and services, especially in cases where the amount 
of financing is equivalent to the payments of profits and interest. 
. In the more general case in which external saving really does contribute with 
an inflow of real resources to the total supply of goods and services, there is , 
nothing to guarantee that in the economic process this contribution will be reflected 
in an increase in the relative participation of domestic investment in total goods 
and services,, and a decrease in the share of total consumption. As a matter of fact, 
the research carried out shows that several situations may arise in different 
countries, as well as within one and the same country. Thus, while numarous cases 
are found, particularly among countries with a high degree of economic dynamism, 
in which the growth of net. external financing is accompanied by an expansion of 
imports and an increase in the participation of domestic investment in total goods 
and services, there-are also many instances in which this does not happen. Hence 
it would seem that in the experience of several countries external indebtedness went 
hand-in-hand with an increase in production capacity, while elsewhere it was 
accompanied by a process through which, to some extent, a larger share fell to total 
consumption, or the. pre-existing relative distribution was maintained. 
B. SOME SALIENT FEATURES OF THE INTERRELATIONS BETWEEN THE EXTERNAL 
SECTOR AND THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC PROCESS IN A GROUP OF 
COUNTRIES 
' • -1. The case of Brazil 
Brazil's experience clearly shows the interrelations between the economic 
process and external variables in the context of different stages of development 
and of the strategies and policies adopted in each of these. In the course followed 
by economic development since the Second World War three phases can be identified: 
(a) The so-called "import substitution" phase," which extended up to the mid-
1960s, and during which thè growth of imports and exports was on a much smaller 
scale than that of the gross domestic product. The latter rose during the period in 
question at an average annual rate of a little over 6%; 
/(b) From 
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(b) From the mid-1960s up to 1974, the Brazilian economy attained peak indexes 
of economic development. So dynamic was it that the gross domestic product increased 
at an annual rate of approximately 8.5%. In the framework of this intense dynamism 
the economy underwent sweeping changes in production and technology and exports 
and imports expanded even faster than the domestic product. 
(c) From the mid-1970s up to the present time, the rate of economic growth has 
declined; although its average level remained relatively high during the period 
1970-1980 (an average annual rate of 6.5%), it dropped in absolute terms in 1981 
(1.9%). The fragmentary data available suggest that very probably the gross domestic 
product will continue to stagnate in 1982. The factors that most conspicuously 
influenced this evolution in recent years are undoubtedly the high balance-of-
payments deficit on current account, which led to a substantial increase in the 
external debt; the heavy financial servicing of this debt, augmented by the rise in 
interest rates; and the negative effect of the deterioration in the terms of trade. 
The action of these various factors has created a typical external bottleneck 
in Brazil's economic development process. And the most significant aspect of this 
situation is the fact that the external constraint does not originate in a slacken:'* 
of exports, since the growth of these was speeded up and diversified; nor does it 
lie in an expansion of imports, which, on an average, remained static or increased 
only slowly as from 1975; rather has it been determined by the servicing of the 
heavy external debt and the unfavourable evolution of the terms of trade. The 
figures bear eloquent witness to this situation. In 1981, payments of external 
profits and interest alone represented 3.2% of the product, whereas in the 1950s 
and 1960s the corresponding proportion had not exceeded 1%. Moreover, the effect 
of the deterioration in the terms of trade (on the basis of 1975 prices) was 
equivalent to 3.7% of the product in the year in question. As for net external 
financing in 1981, it amounted to 3.7% of the product, a proportion exactly the same 
as that of payments of profits and interest. This exposes the vicious circle into 
which the flow of external financing is sinking: payments of profits and interest 
and a further increase in debt. 
Another aspect of special interest is the evolution of gross domestic invest-
ment, domestic saving and total public and private consumption in the context of 
the various phases of Brazil's economic development. From this evolution some 
essential conclusions may be drawn: 
/(a) The 
- 22 -
(a) The coefficient of the relation between gross domestic investment and the 
product tended, as was to be expected, to rise with the speeding-up of the growth 
rate of the domestic product, and to diminish in the second half of the 1970s when 
the rate of economic growth declined. This trend sharpened in 1981 with the 
contraction of the product and investment in absolute terms. In brief, the gross 
domestic investment coefficient, which had been 21% in thé early 1970s, climbed to 
30% in 1974 and fell to approximately 22% in 1981; (b) as a general rule, increases 
in this investment coefficient occurred in the context of an economic process which 
stepped up the use of external financing and increased the product-elasticity of 
imports; (c) in these circumstances, during the first half of the 1970s the 
coefficient of domestic saving tended to rise, revealing a marked dynamism in the 
mobilization of national resources. In contrast-t in the second half of the decade 
this coefficient gradually declined, along with the investment coefficient, while 
the coefficient of net external financing remained relatively high. The gross 
domestic saving coeffient was 21% at the beginning of the decade, rose to 
approximately 21% in the mid-1970s and dropped to 18% in 1981; while since the 
mid-1970s imports of goods and services have expanded very slowly or decreased in 
absolute terms, as happened in 1981. This is another typical element in the 
bottleneck that is affecting the Brazilian economy. 
2. The case of Costa Rica 
The economy .of Costa Rica is characterized by a relatively high degree of 
openness .as regards its external trade flows. In 1981 the value of exports amounted, 
to over 30% of the gross domestic product, and the figure is the same for imports. 
Another inportant feature is the relatively large scale of e>cternal financing, which 
since, the 1970s has come to represent about 10% of the gross domestic product (at 
1975 prices); this means, in comparative terms,, half of the gross domestic investment 
coefficient. 
The rate of economic growth tended to accelerate in the 1960s and up to 1971. 
During the period 1964- to 1974- the gross domestic product showed an average annual 
growth rate of 7.2%. This trend took a drastic turn for the worse.in the second half 
of the decade, when, the annual grovrth rate was a little more than 5%; it remained 
static in 1980 and in .1981 contracted in absolute terms by 3%. 
/During its 
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During its period of greatest dynamism, Costa Rica's economic process was 
characterized by a very high growth rate of imports (an annual average of 9%), and 
by an even more rapid expansion of exports (an annual average rate of 11%). In 
contrast, as from the mid-1970s, exports slackened appreciably, although with very 
irregular fluctuations, as was equally true of import flows. In any event, indexes 
of external financing in relation to the product reached very significant relative 
figures, which implies a substantial increase in the external debt. 
The other factor which had a powerful influence on the balance-of-payments 
deficit was the sum represented by profits on foreign investment and interest on 
the increasing external debt. These remittances, as a whole, rose from a little 
over 2% of the gross domestic product in the early 1970s to almost 7% in 1981. 
The investment coefficient increased over the long term and remained at 
relatively high levels throughout the second half of the 1970s, despite the decrease 
in the rate of economic growth. In 1981, however, it underwent a drastic 
contraction. From a figure of 25%, which roughly represents the average for the 
decade, it dropped to 18%, while domestic saving accounted for only about 50% of 
total gross investment. 
3. The case of Mexico 
Throughout the years following the Second World War the Mexican economy showed 
a long-term economic growth trend reflected in an average annual rate of a little 
over 6.5%. Naturally, in the course of this trend through time, the dynamism of 
the economy underwent spells of decline and invigorization. Thus, in the biennium 
1976 to 1977 the annual rate of. economic growth fell short of 4%, while in the 
subsequent years it exceeded 8%. This dynamism was largely given impetus by the 
production and export of petroleum, and was accompanied by massive increases in 
gross domestic saving. The productive and technological transformation of the 
Mexican economy, in its turn, developed in the context of a pattern of profound 
changes in the nature and structures of the country's external relations. 
During a first phase, up to the mid-1960s, imports and exports increased less 
than the domestic product, shaping the familiar pattern of "import substitution"; 
during the 1970s, in contrast, external relations broadened out considerably. This 
was largely due to the growing importance of petroleum exports and the consequent 
improvement in the terms of trade. At the same time, an expansionist policy, 
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promoted by the inflow of capital and the liberal use of external financing, 
generated a considerable increase in imports during the second half of the decade, 
to such an extreme that their annual percentage growth was 2, 3 and even 1 times as 
high as the growth rate of the domestic product, particularly in the years 1980 and 
1981. 
Gross domestic investment (including inventory variations) increased 
considerably during the 1970s. Its coefficient in relation to' the gross product 
rose from 20.8% in the early.years of the decade to 28.6% in 1981. At the same time, 
the relation between net external financing and the domestic product increased, from 
2.3% to 6.1% in the years mentioned. Thus in 1981, the balance-of-payments deficit 
showed .the highest absolute and relative figure in the whole of the period since 
the Second World War. 
In these circumstances, gross domestic saving also rose, from 18.5% to 22.3%. 
Thus, the participation of gross, domestic investment in the total supply of goods 
tended to increase, while, at the same time the use of external financing showed an 
upward trend. 
The growth of the balance-of-payments deficit on current account led to the 
gradual accumulation of a considerable external debt. External profits and interest 
alone represented in 1981 1.2% of the gross domestic product, while in the early 
1970s the corresponding figure had been only 1.1%. Furthermore, total servicing 
of the external debt, together with profits on foreign investment, today absorb 
51.3% of current export earnings. This indicates an extremely infléxible situation 
with respect to Mexico's external accounts, particularly because of the relations 
that have to be maintained between the evolution of external debt servicing and the 
growth rate of exports. 
1. The case of Peru 
To judge by estimates of the gross domestic product at constant 1975 prices, 
the Peruvian economy attained, over the long term, an average annual growth rate of 
5%, throughout both decades of the period 1950-1970. This rate declined during the 
1970s to an annual average of 3.5%, which improved somewhat in 1981 (1.1%). 
In the 1970s imports, which in the past had increased faster than the product, 
especially during the 1960s, fluctuated very irregularly in one direction or the 
other: during thé second half of the decade they declined in some years and in 
others increased considerably, particularly in the three-year period 1979 to 1981. 
/Exports also 
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Exports also showed a marked instability, which up to a point is inherent in 
the nature and trade flows of the country's principal export products, especially 
fish meal. This instability, which results in significantly wide fluctuations over 
the short term, detracts from the meainingfulness of comparisons between extreme 
years. Even so, the figures at constant 1975 prices suggest that net external 
financing increased appreciably during the 1970s, and also in 1981. It is estimated 
that on an average the financing in question represented over 3% of the gross 
domestic product in the 1970s and approximately 7% in 1981. 
This instability of the external variables affecting the Peruvian economy is 
also reflected in sharp fluctuations in the gross domestic investment coefficient. 
Generally speaking, historically this coefficient tended to decline, and there are 
signs of the same trend in the second half of the 1970s. A similar behaviour pattern 
is to be seen in the coefficient of domestic saving in relation to the gross domestif 
product. 
The rising trend of the balance-of-payments deficit resulted in a considerable 
increase in the external debt, so that payments of profits and interest on foreign 
investment and the external debt came ,to represent 3.2% of the domestic product in 




. ECONOMIC PROSPECTS OF LATIN AMERICA, REGIONAL CO-OPERATION AND 
SOME ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION 
A. ECONOMIC PROSPECTS OF LATIN AMERICA 
The Regional Programme of Action for the 1980s, adopted at Montevideo, 
expresses the region's main aspirations in respect of socio-economic development. 
The attainment of the objectives and targets which the governments have set them-
selves is based on a strategy of economic and social transformation which envisages 
significant changes in Latin America's position in the international economy, in 
economic relations between the countries of the region and with other developing 
areas and in the socio-economic structure of the Latin American countries. 
Now that the first two years covered by the Regional Programme of Action 
have elapsed, it can be seen that the international situation, far from changing 
in a direction favourable to economic dynamism combined with better-balanced 
external accounts, has swung the opposite way, and its evolution has come to be 
a very significant element in the recession affecting the Latin American countries. 
In these circumstances, the importance of many of the proposals of a regional 
character contained in the Programme is reinforced. Thus, in so far as the signs 
of international co-operation continue to be discouraging, the Latin American 
countries will obviously have to channel increasing proportions of their produc-
tion and trade towards the markets of the region and of the rest of the developing 
countries, as well as towards their own domestic markets. A recovery in the 
developed countries' production and in world trade would undoubtedly facilitate 
the tasks in hand, but it clearly cannot become the indispensable requisite for 
the Latin American countries to regain their economic dynamism. 
In the earlier chapters of the present document the repercussions of the 
world recession on the Latin American countries were discussed. The data for 1981 
and the provisional information available for 1982 show that external disequilibria 
have radically weakened economic growth and have had serious effects on the social 
situation. In these circumstances, changes in policy have come about which, with 
greater or lesser degrees of emphasis, aire switching the possibilities of reacti-
vation to the domestic and regional markets. A process of negotiation of external 
financing transactions is also under way, its aim being to make the balance-of-
/payments situation 
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payments situation manageable. But even if progress is achieved in the fields of 
trade and finance, it seems hardly likely that the general recessive effects 
transmitted from the developed world can be significantly counteracted in 1983. 
Accordingly, the following review of prospects is based on the assumption of a more 
important recovery as from the biennium 1984-1985, as a step towards greater acce-
leration of economic dynamism in the second quinquennium of the 1980s. 
The normative objectives and targets pursued by the region were clearly 
established in the Regional Programme of Action, and there is no intention here of 
preparing new projections of that kind. It has been thought useful, however, to 
present two exercises of a preliminary type whose sole purpose is to offer provi-
sional orders of magnitude in respect of the effects that would be produced by a 
recovery of economic dynamism on the main internal and external macroeconomic 
factors of equilibrium. Basically, the exercises differ from each other in their 
assumptions as to the economic evolution of the developed countries and of world 
trade. Obviously, the more vigorous the reactivation of the developed economies, 
the better are the chances that the second quinquennium of the 1980s will usher in 
a dynamism more similar to that contemplated at the Third Meeting of the inter-
American Development Bank (IDB). 
In the period 1983-1985 a nroderate reactivation is expected, which would 
enable the region to attain average growth rates somewhat below 4% for the period 
1981-1985. If this recovery were to be combined with a growth rate of about 6% 
during the second quinquennium, the average rate for the whole decade would 
approach 5%. If, as alreacty- stated, the growth rate achieved in the second 
quinquennium were slightly higher than 7%, the decade would end with an average 
of approximately 5.6% (see table 1). 
The mere study of these aggregate figures reveals how deeply the region 
would be affected by the crisis. There can be no doubt that the reduction of the 
average economic growth rate for the decade will have profound repercussions on 
the economic and social situation. 
In the economic field, it will be necessary to cope with a state of indebted-
ness that will weigh heavily on the external accounts for a lengthy period, which 
will unquestionably be prolonged in so far as external demand and the terms of 
trade fail to recover. Similarly, the producer sectors will have to readapt 
themselves to new demand and supply conditions. 
/Table 1 
Table 1 
LATIN AMERICA (19 countries): a/ DISTRIBUTION OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND EVOLUTION OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR 




























































































Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
Note; "A" exercise assuming recovery of the growth rate of the gross domestic product of the 1970s in the second 
half of the 1980s. 
"A 1" corresponds to exercise "A" plus the hypothesis of an average decrease in interest rates from 12% to 
10% in the decade, and maintenance of export requirements, 
"B" exercise assuming recovery and acceleration of the growth rate of the gross domestic product during 
the second half of the 1980s, ' 
a/ Not including Cuba or the English-speaking countries of the Caribbean, 
b/ Of values at 1975 prices, 
c/ Including net private donations. 
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In the social aspects of the situation, setbacks in terms of employment and 
distribution have occurred in the two-year period which will be far from easy to 
reverse. An accentuation of the social orientation of policies thus becomes indis-
pensable, both for reasons of equity, and as an indispensable requisite for the 
reactivation of the domestic markets. 
At the opening of the 1980s, the secretariat drew attention to the nature 
and magnitude of employment problems. To these difficulties, significant in them-
selves, must now be added the consequences of the virtual non-existence of 
economic growth in 1981-1982. It is estimated that in this biennium the labour 
force increased by about 5.5%; for the mere reason that there has been no increase 
in job opportunities a rise of about 5 points should be expected in the percentage 
of overt unemployment. Moreover, the crisis has compelled some enterprises to 
step up their productivity and others to declare themselves bankrupt and close 
down altogether. Thus, even if as from 1983 a level of activity were regained 
similar to the 7% which secretariat studies assumed necessary to absorb the growth 
of the labour force and gradually reduce underemployment, the period 1983-1990 
would start with a backlog of overt unemployment amounting to more than 10%. Given 
the present style of development many years of rapid economic growth will be needed 
for the productive absorption of this contingent of human beings that has been 
cut off from job opportunities. Although part of this group may possibly find 
forms of underemployment which are not reflected in overt unemployment statistics, 
it is indispensable to reinforce. the employment policies contained in the Regional 
Programme of Action in order to tackle so serious a problem. 
The fall in real wages is another source of profound concern. To set up 
this reduction as a condition for an increase in employment and domestic saving 
might have adverse effects on the role that it is desired to assign to the domestic 
market in economic recovery, and on the social objectives postulated for the 
development process. What seems essential in this respect is a simultaneous 
revision of policies relating to the consumption and saving of the upper income 
strata and of the government. The consolidation, of a domestic market, in which 
the participation of the broad masses and the process of capital accumulation 
acquire increasing importance and a high degree of permanence, will be a decisive 
factor in the definition of policies concerning real wages, saving and investment. 
/The degree 
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The degree of dynamism postulated in the exercises will call for growth 
rates of saving and investment which resemble or somewhat exceed those recorded 
over the long terra. Of course, to reach investment percentages ranging from 21% 
in 1990 according to the first exercise to 27% in 1990 according to the second 
exercise, will imply extra effort in view of the deterioration shown by the initial 
situation today (see table 2). 
These amounts of investment represent, moreover, a component of demand of 
the greatest importance for development strategies in which regional integration 
will play a more important part than in the past. The investment required in 1990 
for the 19 countries under'consideration to attain the growth rate for the gross 
domestic product envisaged in the first exercise (5.0%) would be about 170 000 
million dollars at 1975 prices; and this investment figure would rise to 204 000 
million dollars if the targets established in the second'exercise were to be 
reached (see table 3). The size rof investment requirements reflects a significant 
potential demand which would have to be taken into account in drawing up any 
industrial complementarity or intra-regional co-operation programme. 
Similarly, the speeding-up of the "growth rate will necessitate appreciable 
increases in domestic saving. By the end of the decade the coefficient in relation 
to the domestic product would exceed 20% and 23% in the two exercises, and this 
would require annual growth rates of 5.8% and 8.1%, respectively, as from 1981. 
It should be noted that this increment in domestic saving-'is indispensable if, as 
will be presently explained, the relative importance of the external debt is to 
be appreciably reduced. •• 
One of the central problems with which the Latin American countries have to 
cope in the present economic conjuncture is the critical balance-of-payments situa-
tion, whose characteristics have already been discussed in some detail. In this 
context, it is useful to explore a few lines of policy which may facilitate p'lacir.g 
the region on a' new footing in the international economy, reducing the impact of 
external pressures, and undertaking joint action at the regional level whereby 
Latin America will be enabled to meet the challenge of the existing situation. 
In external relations three broad areas of action are generally distinguished 
in which'measures could be adopted to further an appreciable improvement in the 
delicate situation of the Latin American external sector: (i) international trade, 
(ii) external financing and (iii) international co-operation. In the field of 
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Table 1 
LATIN AMERICA (19 countries): a/ DISTRIBUTION OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND EVOLUTION OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR 

























1970 100.0 21.7 75.5 15.6 12.8 -3.0 1.9 2.2 
1980 100.0 24.9 78.3 13.3 16.5 1.7 2.4 3.9 
1981 100.0 24.3 78.1 14.2 
A 
16.6 0.8 3.4 5.0 
1990 100.0 23.9 76.6 
A 
15.4 15.9 0.5 3.3 3.3 
1990 100.0 23.9 76.6 
ft X 
15.4 15.9 0.5 2.6 2.5 
1990 100.0 27.4 73.3 
£1 
15.6 16.3 0.6 3.2 3.5 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
Note: "A" exercise assuming recovery of the growth rate of the gross domestic product of the 1970s in the second 
half of the 1980s. 
"A 1" corresponds to exercise "A" plus the hypothesis of an average decrease in interest rates from 12% to 
10% in the decade, and maintenance of export requirements. 
"B" exercise assuming recovery and acceleration of the growth rate of the gross domestic product during 
the second half of the 1980s, 
a/ Not including Cuba or the Englis-speaking countries of the Caribbean, 
b/ Of values at 1975 prices, 
c/ Including net private donations. 
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Table 1 
LATIN AMERICA (19 countries):a/ DISTRIBUTION OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND EVOLUTION OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR 
(Millions of dollars at 1975 prices) 
Gross Gross Total Exports of Imports of Terms-of- Net payment Net 
Year domestic domestic consump- goods and goods and trade of profits external 
product investment tion services services effect and interest financing b/ 
1970 253 930.7 55 206.7 191 704.9 39 547.4 32 528.3 -7 692.3 4 941.3 5 615.1 
1980 451 011.7 112 423.5 352 982.3 59 902.3 74 296.4 7 740.4 10 894.6 17 549.0 
1981 456 127.2 111 031.6 356 124.5 64 555.4 75 
A 
584.3 3 688.2 15 385.8. 22 724.9 
1985 529 143.6 133 280.6 401 976.4 77 176.0 
n 
83 289.8 3 134.9 19 473.9 22 286.6 
1990 707 776.3 169 129.4 542 111.7 108 894.2 112 
A 1 
358.7 3 790.5 23 408.4 23 034.3 
1985 529 143.6 133 280.6 401 976.0 77 176.0 
A J. 
83 289.8 .3 134.9 16 179.6 18 992.5 
1990 707 776.3 169 129.4 542 111.7 108 894.1 112 358.7 3 790.5 18 349.2 17 855.8 
1985 529 143.5 133 280.6 401 976.4 77 176.0 
is 
83 289.8 3 134.9 19 473.9 22 286.6 
1990 745 015.0 203 871.9 546 215.0 116 138.7 121 210.2 4 524.1 23 759.0 25 918.5 
Source : CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
Note: "A" exercise assuming recovery of the growth rate of the gross domestic product of the 1970s in the second half 
. of the 1980s. 
"A 1" corresponds to exercise "A" plus the hypothesis of an average decrease in interest rates from 12% to 10% in 
the decade, and maintenance of export requirements. 
"B" exercise assuming recovery and acceleration.of the growth rate of the gross domestic product during the 
second half of the 1980s. 
a/ Not including Cuba or the English-speaking countries of the Caribbean, 
b/ including net private donations. 
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international trade, measures should be directed towards a decisive increase in 
export earnings, either through expansion of the volumes exported or through an 
improvement in prices, or through both these things at once; attention should 
also be devoted to the region's possibilities of supplying increasing percentages 
of imports with a satisfactory degree of economic efficiency. In the area of 
external financing, it is indispensable to call for a redefinition of the condi-
tions (loan periods and rates of interest) on which these resources have been 
transferred to the Latin American countries. Lastly, in the sphere of inter-
national co-operation, the region should take concerted action to obtain better 
contitions of access to the markets of the industrialized economies, and should 
intensify intra-regional collaboration and co-operation with other countries of 
the Third World. As this last area to a certain extent overlaps the first two 
and possible propositions are closely linked to those put forward in respect of 
them, the analysis will be focused on the first two aspects in question. 
Obviously, solutions based on the expansion of international trade would 
tend to give the region a greater degree of autonomy than those that postulate 
a moratorium in the servicing of the external debt, since they have more to do 
with the countries' own decisions. They depend not only upon the capacity to 
generate increasing flows of exportable products, but also, and to a large extent, 
on concerted intra-regional action. The first requisite is linked to the creation 
and adaptation of domestic production capacity which will allow of a more vigorous 
and diversified export drive; thus, an indispensable step is the strengthening of 
the economic structure and its readjustment in this direction. The other require-
ment is regional integration and co-operation, which must be regarded as an 
essential component of the dynamism of exports, both from the standpoint of the 
broadening of markets, through regional co-operation, and from that of united 
action and adoption of joint policies in trade negotiations with the industrialized 
countries. 
These two aspects have already been underlined in the Regional Action 
Programme in the context of the need to boost export earnings. In the projections 
prepared to that end 6/ attention was drawn to the changes in the composition and 
destination of exports that were needed to make this increase in earnings possible. 
6/ Latin American Development Projections for the 1980s (E/CEPAL/G.1158/ 
Rev.1)7 United Nations publication (Santiago, Chile), April 1982. 
/Another point 
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Another point emphasized was that manufactures ought to be the most dynamic Latin 
American export item, and that efforts to boost them would have to be based mainly 
on intra-regional trade.7/ Moreover, a significant effort would have to be made to 
increase exports of primary commodities and fuels, to expand trade with other 
developing areas and with the socialist countries and to secure a more co-operative 
attitude on the part of the industrial countries. . .. 
The radical deterioration in the terms of trade which took place in 1981-1982 
has placed the region in an extremely delicate situation. The greater the recovery 
in the prices of Latin American exports, above all those of primary commodities, 
the easier it will be to cope with the balance-of-payments problems. This latter 
possibility, however, is largely outside the range of the region's power of deci-
sion. In contrast, the expansion of intra-regional trade depends to a great extent 
on internal decisions. In so far as.the. pertinent targets set up in the Regional 
Programme of- Action aije attained, a change in the terms of trade should occur in 
consequence of the greater asymmetry that foreign trade would acquire. 
As regards net external financing, possible lines of action are to a very 
great extent conditioned by the region's present situation of indebtedness. The 
high levels of the external debt and its servicing clearly reveal the impossibility 
of keeping up the trend which net external financing has been following in recent 
years. Consequently, possible measures would have-to be directed towards 
relieving pressure on the balance of payments through a change in the terms of 
the existing debt and an inflow of new credits which * by virtue of the special 
terms on which they were extended, would not result in additional pressure. 
The foregoing aspects have been taken into account in the projection exercises 
cited, with the aim of bringing them to the fore, establishing certain orders of 
magnitude of external macroeconomic relations and analysing their possible 
implications. 
The projections have established the reduction of relative levels of indebted-
ness as an essential condition for a more balanced management of external accounts. 
To that end a gradual decrease in the external-financing product ratio is assumed, 
2J The. proportion of total exports for which manufactures account would have 
to rise from 15% at the present time to 42% in 1990, which would require annual 
growth rates of about 17%. Intra-regional trade, on its. part, would have practical-
ly to double its participation. 
/so that 
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so that by 1990 the percentage in question would be more or less similar to the 
average for the 1970s. That is, in Latin America's case the proportion referred 
to would decline from 5.0% of the gross domestic product in 1981 to 3.4% in 1990. 
This proposition is complemented by another restriction which postulates that debt 
servicing should not exceed a predetermined proportion of the value of exports. 
Secondly, it is assumed that the terms of trade will remain constant at their 1981 
level, which constitutes a relatively pessimistic hypothesis, based on the obser-
vations made in earlier paragraphs. A final hypothesis is that the terms of the 
external debt as regards loan periods and rates of interest will more closely 
resemble those of the second quinquennium of the 1970s than those of today, which 
implies accepting that the region will have some degree of success in the negotia-
tion of its debt. 
The internal repercussions of this relative decrease in external financing 
would be reflected, as already pointed out, in a rise in the levels of domestic 
saving. In this connection, it should be noted that the participation of saving 
in the financing of total gross investment would climb from the level reached in 
1981 (almost 80%) to 86% and 87% in 1990, in the first and second exercises, 
respectively. 
Within the frame of reference described, in both exercises imports would 
grow at the very slow rate of 2.5% up to 1985. This would reflect on the one hand 
the effects of the recession on the countries' foreign trade, and, on the other, 
the restrictive policies that have been applied on account of the familiar balance-
of-payments problems. After 1985, given the speeding-up of economic growth and 
the improvement of terms that are postulated, import requirements to sustain this 
growth will be considerably greater. For the region as a whole, their annual rate 
of increase would have to be higher than that of the gross domestic product: i.e., 
6.2% in the first exercise (against 6% for the product) and 7.8% in the second 
exercise (7.1% for the product). These rates imply, however, a decline in the 
long-term product/elasticity of imports (see table 1). 
The exports projected are such as would correspond to the earnings required 
for financing the imports in question and attaining the expected level of net 
external financing. These amounts necessitate relatively high growth rates in 
both exercises. In the first they are reflected in an annual rate of 6.0% in the 
period 1981-1990, and in the second the rate rises to 6.7%. It is worth noting 
/that the 
that the necessary rate of expansion of exports fits fairly easily into the 
export potential developed by the region in recent years; it must not be forgotten, 
however, that measures and decisions in international trade are of a multilateral 
character, which makes it indispensable to strengthen the system of international 
co-operation if the goals established are to be reached. 
Export expansion requirements are determined not only by the relatively high 
economic growth rates which are postulated for the second quinquennium, and which 
are reflected in large volumes of imports, but also by the heavy external debt 
accumulated and the high interest rates in force. The accumulation of the external 
debt has generated services which call for abundant export earnings to meet the 
targets established with respect to external financing. Analysis of the period 
1981-1985 makes this clear. As already said, imports would have to increase by 
only 2,5% a year, whereas exports would need to do so by 4,6%, If it is taken 
into account that in 1981 the servicing of the external debt absorbed about 40% 
of current export earnings, it becomes obvious that a relation of this magnitude 
cannot be kept up without aggravating the already delicate balance-of-payments 
situation; hence the proposal that it should be reduced to about 35% by the end of 
the decade (see table 4), 
The restrictions imposed on net external financing in relation to the product, 
and on the servicing of the external debt in relation to export earnings, 
necessitate -as has been pointed out- a major effort to increase exports. But 
such an effort is inevitable if Latin America's external sector is to be placed 
on a sound footing and the bases are to be established for achieving an economic 
growth less vulnerable to external vicissitudes. Although it might be possible 
to obtain more external financing than is projected in these exercises, require-
ments in respect of export earnings would not appreciably decrease, because of 
the high percentage which is tied up in the servicing of the external debt and 
which is precisely what it is proposed to reduce. In this connection it should 
be pointed out that even with the severe restrictions imposed on external financ-
ing, the servicing of the external debt would rise by 1990 to about 175 000 million 




LATIN AMERICA (19 countries):a/ EVOLUTION AND PROJECTIONS OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR 
(Percentages on the basis of current prices) 
Percentage relations with exports of goods and services Relation between 
external debt .and 
Year Net payment Net external Servicing of external debt gross domestic 
of profits financing product cj 



































































Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
Note: '"A" exercise assuming recovery of the growth rate of the gross domestic product of the 1970s in the 
second half of the 1980s. 
"A 1" corresponds to exercise "A" plus the hypothesis of an average decrease in interest rates from 
12% to 10% in the decade, and maintenance of export requirements. 
"B" exercise assuming recovery and acceleration of the growth rate of the gross domestic product 
during the second half of the 1980s, 
a/ Not including Cuba or the English-speaking countries of the Caribbean, 
b/ Including net private donations. 
^ c/ On the basis of values at 1975 prices. The debt balance was deflated with the implicit index of imports 





LATIN AMERICA (19 COUNTRIES):a/ EVOLUTION AND PROJECTIONS OF FINANCIAL VARIABLES OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR 
(Millions of dollars at current prices) 
Net payment N e t e x t e r n a ^ External debt servicing Exports of 
Year of profits . , . ' goods and 
and interest ® — Amortization Interest Total services 
1970 2 751.1 3 046.6 2 195.9 938.9 3 134.8 17 106.8 
1980 17 956.6 28 256.0 18 474.5 14 031.9 32 506.4 106 011.0 
1981 26 558.0 38 369.8 22 667.2 
a 
21 599.7 44 219.9 114 676.9 
1985 51 222.9 58 741.2 50 
A 
682.9 39 809.7 90 492.6 208 852.6 
1990 100 364.9 100 260.3 96 097.3 77 830.8 173 928.1 471 712.9 
A 1 
1985 42 622.8 50 141.1 48 370.6 31 489.5 79 860.4 208 852.6 
1990 78 477.4 78 372.9 85 032.0 
T) 
57 620.4 142 652.4 471 712.6 
1985 51 222.9 58 741.2 50 
is 
682.9 39 809.7 90 492.6 208 852.6 
1990 101 314.2 104 822.4 97 162.3 78 658.2 175 820.5 505 163.8 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
Note; "A" exercise assuming recovery of the growth rate of the gross domestic product of the 1970s in the 
second half of the 1980s. "A 1" corresponds to axercise "A" plus the hypothesis of an average decrease 
in interest rates from 12% to 10% in the decade, and maintenance of export requirements. "B" exercise 
assuming recovery and acceleration of the growth rate of the gross domestic product during the second 
half of the 1980s. 
a/ Not including Cuba or the English-speaking countries of the Caribbean. 
b/ Including net private donations. 
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Attention has previously been drawn to the importance that has attached to 
the high interest rates in the world financial situation in recent years. With 
the aim of examining the implications of lower interest rates for external-sector 
variables, another exercise was carried out, derived from the first, in which 
the average rate of interest was lowered by two points and export requirements 
remained the same as in the first exercise. The results show a marked reduction 
in 1990 of the percentages of the gross domestic product represented by net pay-
ments of profits and interest, on the one hand, and net external financing on the 
other; in both cases these relations fell from approximately 3.3% to 2.5%. Further-
more, the servicing of the external debt would correspond to about 30% of current 
export earnings and the coefficient of the external debt in relation to the gross 
domestic product would drop from 23% to 19% in the same year. The significance 
of this reduction becomes clearer still if it is borne in mind that by 1990 the 
servicing of the debt would amount to only 1M-3 000 million dollars; that is, 
31 000 million less than in the reference example (see table 4). It is important 
to note that this considerable impact is closely linked to the maintenance of 
the export earnings assumed in the basic exercise. 
To sum up, the results obtained make it possible to show not only the 
magnitude of the balance-of-payments problem and the principal factors that 
determine it, but also the considerable effort represented by certain policies 
designed to bring about a more balanced external situation. In this context, 
orders of magnitude are presented which make it possible to evaluate the absolute 
and relative importance that might attach to the expansion of export earnings and 
to new terms and amounts of external financing. 
Lastly, the achievement of more equilibrium in the balance-of-payments 
situation will necessitate a set of measures relating to trade and external financ-
ing. In view of the importance of the subject, the other two sections of the 
present chapter are devoted to the suggestion of lines of action and policy 
measures for regional co-operation with other developing areas and with the 
developed countries. 
/B. REGIONAL 
B. REGIONAL CO-OPERATION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
1. Priority areas 
Latin America has.demonstrated by now its ability to produce a large 
proportion of consumer manufactures, but it still shows great limitations in the 
manufacture of capital goods, intermediate products and certain consumer goods 
for which advanced technology is required. It is precisely these lines of production 
that need economic spaces which, as a general rule, exceed those separately offered 
by the national markets of the Latin American countries. Consequently, integration 
and co-operation are irreplaceable in their significance as basic mechanisms for 
complementing and accelerating these countries* industrialization processes, 
although this in no way detracts from the importance of the role they may also play 
in strengthening intra-regional commodity trade. 
There are, of course, innumerable ways in which pooled action can make a 
substantial contribution to attainment of the objectives indicated while helping 
in addition to reach other goals of interest to the Latin American countries. 
In a CEPAL document presented at the Commission's nineteenth session 
(Montevideo, May 1981),8/ a descriptive list was given of the possible priority 
areas for co-operation in the decade now beginning. This seems an appropriate 
opportunity for a review in depth of those spheres of action in which the Latin 
American countries should concentrate their co-operation efforts. 
Thus, in addition to the assumption of the indispensable and resolute support 
of the countries of the region for the various integration systems existing in 
Latin America and the Caribbean -whose ultimate objective is essentially to create 
a zonal or subregional market which will promote an industrialization process of 
greater depth and scope- attention is devoted below to the fields in which 
co-operation can do a very great deal to speed up the development of the countries 
of the region. 
8/ See CEPAL, Regional integration and co-operation in the 19 80s 
(E/CEPAL/G.1151), April 1981. 
/2. Joint 
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2. Joint rational development of resources and compensation 
for regional disequilibria 
Efforts should be made to initiate or continue co-operative action to bring 
about: (i) a greater degree of self-reliance in regional supplies of food and raw 
materials in general; (ii) joint use of shared resources, such as water; 
(iii) re-channelling of trade flows in respect of primary commodities which the 
region exports to third countries and at the same time imports from the countries 
in question; (iv) improvement of income from commodity exports, through an increase 
in local processing which will raise their incorporated value added and lead to 
greater national participation in the distribution and marketing phases, as well 
as to a stronger position in international commodity negotiations. All these 
initiatives should be undertaken in an adequate framework of rational use of 
resources. 
3. Energy 
In this field there are major areas which have not been the object of 
sufficient attention, including, inter alia, the development of non-conventional 
energy resources; the systematization of full, rapid and accurate information, 
especially with regard to petroleum and petroleum products; manpower training; 
management of enterprises; and, in general, everything related to energy economics 
and technology. Lastly, it would be of interest to continue in greater depth 
co-operation efforts such as those made in recent years by Mexico and Venezuela 
with a view to relieving the situation of the Central American and Caribbean 
countries which are net petroleum importers. 
Physical integration of transport and communications facilities 
and co-operation in respect of these 
and other public services 
In order to surmount the obstacles posed by the long geographical distances 
existing between the countries of the region and to promote more efficient 
utilization of the existent infrastructure, it is important to pursue the 
initiatives aimed at facilitating the movement of persons and goods and at inter-
connecting the various transport and communications media. It will also be 
necessary to promote closer collaboration -especially in respect of production 
/techniques for 
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techniques for certain inputs and capital goods- in other ..public services, such as 
drinking water, irrigation, urban sanitation and"underground railways in metropo-
litan areas. 
5* Pood and agriculture 
In this sector there is much potential room for co-operation activities in 
such fields as technology, foreign trade and the region's ability to supply its 
own food requirements. Complementarity in production, in line with climatic 
characteristics or the type of land available, may give rise to long-term supply 
agreements between groups of countries. Another point to note is that limitations 
in the available supply of foreign exchange, and in other respects make it advisable 
that the region should produce as high a proportion as possible of the food it 
requires. 
6. Science and technology 
Science and technology are related with all productive activities and with 
the creation, application, dissemination, control and ownership of knowledge. 
Among the co-operation activities of regional interest may be mentioned the 
strengthening of scientific and technological capacity; promotion of the adaptation 
or creation of technology linked to priority sectors (energy, food, capital goods, 
etc.); interconnection of scientific and technological networks; organization of . 
Latin American multinational technological enterprises; financing for the develop-
ment of science and technology; and the adoption of common regional positions in 
international negotiations on such matters as industrial property and a code of 
conduct in technology. 
7. Co-operation in industry 
Apart from moves towards the creation of a common market, whose main 
beneficiary would be manufacturing industry, there are other co-operation activities 
relating to specific branches of industry at the level of both public and private 
enterprises. Complementarity or joint programming of industrial branches of high 
capital density and volume and with large scales of production, such as petro-
chemicals, the aluminium industry, shipbuilding, the iron and steel industry or 
the production of electronic components may contribute to a considerable increase 
in their efficiency and feasibility. A similar case is that of capital goods or 




There now exist financial mechanisms, both on a regional scale and within the 
integration systems, intended to facilitate trade between such systems, to support 
countries with balance-of-payments deficits and to finance projects relating to 
integration industries. Nevertheless, co-operation in seeking new zonal and extra-
zonal sources of financing and in putting into operation an export insurance system 
is still of great importance, especially in order to cope with the needs for long-
term credit generated by the energy disequilibria of many countries in the region, 
by the urgent necessity to create and consolidate new export flows, by the additional 
demand for financing which will result from increased trade in capital goods, and 
by the need to concert major financial arrangements in support of binaticnal or 
multinational co-operation activities. 
At all events, present circumstances open up the opportunity of improving the 
above-mentioned existing forms of regional and subregional financial co-operation 
in Latin America. It would therefore be desirable: 
(a) To give greater impetus to negotiations conducted to secure larger amounts 
of reciprocal credits and longer repayment-periods under the ALADI system of compen-
sation of balances and reciprocal credits. The success of this system, which has 
been in operation for more than 15 years, warrants extending the time limit for 
compensation of balances to 6 months, which would mean likewise enlarging reciprocal 
credit amounts so that as far as possible payment before the end of the compen-
sation period could be avoided; 
(b) To interlink the payment systems of the Central American Common Market 
and of ALADI. The interconnection of these systems, which would make it possible 
to operate at the Latin American level, has already been studied from the technical 
point of view, and the reason why no further progress has been made is basically 
the want of agreement as to the interest rates that should be applied and the length 
of the compensation period. If the compensation period were extended to 6 months 
under the ALADI system, it would be exactly the same as that used in the Central 
American Common Market, so that it would cease to be a factor of conflict. It 
should also be possible to reach rapid agreement on rates of interest; 
/(c) To 
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(c) To increase credit amounts and repayment periods under the Santo Domingo 
Financial Assistance Agreement (to support trade balances and the balance of 
payments). This Agreement has been invoked on various occasions by several countries 
and in every case has worked satisfactorily. However, the resources at present 
committed under the Agreement are still of very little significance.and the credit 
repayment periods are too short. Larger amounts and longer repayment periods 
would facilitate balance-of-payments financing in Latin America and would expedite 
intra-Latin American trade; 
(d) To re-update studies for the purpose of establishing a Financial Security 
Network in Latin America, on the basis of the proposal submitted by CEPAL itself 
in the mid-1970s. The idea propounded envisages a' commitment on the part of 
Latin American official financial institutions to provide funds as "last-resource 
lenders", where a member country so requests and provided that the country in 
question had previously resorted to other sources of financing, including the 
International Monetary Fund. The mechanism would create a system of evaluation and 
consultation which might sow the seeds of closer co-operation in the future in 
fields other than that of financing and in other aspects of financing itself. 
9. Co-operation in the field of services, in particular in 
consulting and engineering 
Consulting and engineering services have come to constitute, in some 
countries of the region, a significant item in their external trade, and, compie-
mentarily, it can be seen that there is a wide field for the development of the 
technological and scientific know-how by which these activities are sustained. 
Although all the countries, to a greater or lesser extent, possess experience and 
knowledge of the technology used in the production sectors most characteristic of 
their economies, there are still big gaps that can be filled if the capacities of 
the whole group of countries are appropriately combined and collective initiatives, 
are undertaken with a view to making better" use of national consulting and engi-
neering resources. The possibility of co-cperating in large-scale works in such 
sectors as energy, transport and communications, mining, etc., may give continuity 
to the application of specialized knowledge, eliminating the sharp fluctuations in 
demand for consulting and engineering services within each country, and helping to 
train the Latin American countries for undertaking works in common outside the region 
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10. Export promotion 
Regional co-operation in the area of export promotion might be directed 
both towards improving knowledge of potential external markets and towards 
strengthening Latin America's bargaining power, and, in addition, towards 
presenting a united front in face of the protectionist measures applied by the 
developed countries. Thus, regional co-operation among governments and among 
enterprises and their associations may help to perfect the various instruments 
of promotion (including insurance and re-insurance), to pool exportable supplies, 
to maintain publicity campaigns, to form associations of producers of exportable 
goods, to create multinational external marketing enterprises and to take such 
collective action as will facilitate access to international markets. 
Co-operation with the relatively less developed 
countries of the region 
If co-operation among the Latin American countries is to succeed it calls 
for special consideration of the principle of reciprocity, in the sense that 
the small and medium-sized countries which have not advanced in the industrial-
ization process at the same rate as the larger countries should receive special 
support treatment, both under integration schemes and in all economic and 
commercial relations with the more developed countries of the region. Admit-
tedly, this essential aspect of intra-regional relationships has been attended 
by serious problems when attempts have been made to put it into practice, 
either because of shortcomings in the means used to implement it or because the 
less developed countries have but slight possibilities of taking advantage of 
the opportunities offered. But at the present time there are sound political, 
economic and ethical reasons for seeking new paths and formulas which may 
contribute to the attainment of a more satisfactory intra-regional equilibrium. 
/C. SOME 
- 46 -
C. SOME ASPECTS OF CO-OPERATION AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 
AND WITH OTHER DEVELOPING AREAS 
1* General remarks 
In the 1970s the industrialized countries were harassed by persistent 
inflation, increasing unemployment and a very unstable balance-of-payments . 
situation, in terms both of surpluses and deficits and of fluctuations in exchange 
rates. The policies applied to tackle -these problems had major repercussions 
on the developing countries, above all on the non-petroleum-exporting, group. 
Deserving of special mention is the impact of the combination of inflation and 
greater international liquidity whereby the industrial countries sought to cope 
with the first fuel crisis. In Latin America's case, as. previously noted, the 
countries of the region made use of the abundant supply of credit and contracted 
heavy debts, with the aim of forestalling, as far as possible, significant 
declines in the growth rate of imports and of the product (and in some cases 
of consumption). Furthermore, through foreign trade, they added a considerable 
component of imported inflation to what were already traditional inflationary 
problems of their own. 
At the beginning of the 1980s the United States decisively changed its 
policy, which altered the international panorama. The greater importance 
attached to anti-inflationary policies, in contrast with what happened in the 
crisis that started in 1974, resulted in a deeper-seated and more prolonged 
recession, a pronounced increase in unemployment and a notable rise in real 
interest rates. The effects on the developing countries have been manifold and 
have been superimposed on a high level of indebtedness which did hot exist in 
1973, thus fostering a situation of deterioration and instability which has 
already been described in previous chapters with respect to Latin America. 
Increasing unemployment and difficulties of production and financing in 
many developed countries acted as a spur to protectionist tendencies just at 
the very time when, paradoxically, a tendency to adopt policies of openness in 
trade and finance was mainly predominant in the developing countries. The 
recession in the industrial countries added to their growing protectionism a 
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decline in demand for primary commodities and in their prices, thus bringing 
about a clearly-defined trend towards an imbalance in foreign trade, as has been 
pointed out in earlier chapters. 
Accordingly, the 1981-1982 crisis finds the Latin American countries in a 
particularly vulnerable situation, in the first place because their greater openness 
to international trade and to movements of capital facilitates the transmission of 
external impacts. Secondly, their high level of indebtedness seriously limits their 
chances of obtaining additional financing to cope with their balance-of-payments 
crises. Thirdly, some developing countries have not enough foreign exchange 
resources or accommodative capacity to maintain the regular servicing of their 
external debt, above all in view of the stagnation of international trade and the 
fact that their terms of trade have deteriorated. 
The international trade and financial situation is reflected in a restrictive 
tendency in international banking systems, whose loan portfolio is affected by the 
world recession and particularly by the increasing difficulties of some debtor 
countries. Furthermore, the recession which is beginning to make itself felt in 
the Latin American countries in 1981-1982 has already compelled the Central Banks 
of some countries to adopt measures in support of the national banking systems. 
In this connection, it should be borne in mind that a financial bank serves 
as an intermediary not only between savers and users of funds, but also between the 
present and the future. When cyclical fluctuations are very marked and are 
accompanied by sharp fluctuations in the exchange rates of reserve currencies, 
the possibility of intermediation between present and future diminishes, because 
the banks consider its economic feasibility to have lessened. If this phenomenon 
spreads to many banks, a choice has to be made between official support for the 
system or a major financial crisis; this holds good both on the national and on 
the international plane. 
Thus, there is no solution for the foreign trade.crisis in the field of 
finance; rather are the recessive trends strengthened, with the serious economic 
and social consequences already indicated in the present document. 
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2* Some aspects of international co-operation 
(a) North-South co-operation 
A general warning, of almost obvious purport yet indispensable, is that 
measures to reactivate the world economy must be adopted within the framework of 
necessary moves to bring about changes in greater depth which will lead not only to 
a reacceieration and reorientation of economic and social development at the world, 
regional and national levels, but also to a reorganization of international economic 
relations. It should be added that the implementation of such initiatives will be 
easier if, in the different countries, it is approached in a dynamic context within 
which price stabilization measures are not adopted at the cost of stagnation of 
investment and continuous worsening of the unemployment situation. 
It is important to reiterate, too, that the principal capacity for action 
to reactivate the world economy lies in the hands of the industrialized countries, 
inasmuch as they constitute the hub of the system of international relations. Thus, 
an indispensable and priority requisite for the reactivation in question is a 
resolute, co-ordinated and steadfast policy on the part of those countries, aimed 
at surmounting the conjunctural and structural problems that are affecting their 
development processes, including those linked to the reorganization of energy 
resources and to the redeployment of industry. In this sense, the efficacy of the 
action undertaken is clearly correlative to the coherence both of the diagnoses 
made and of the measures adopted with respect to the trends and difficulties 
observable in the various industrialized countries. 
At the level of the world economy, the international community, through the 
IDS for the United Nations Third Development Decade, has proposed specific objectives 
and targets for the developing countries, which have been ratified by the Latin 
American governments and the Regional Programme of Action. In this connection, the 
policies and measures adopted, both at the world and at thè Latin American level, 
will have to take into account, inter alia, the points listed below: 
(i) Countries with large and continuing balance-of-payments surpluses on 
current account should establish policies to facilitate their imports, since they 
are obviously in a privileged position to restore the dynamism of world trade; 
(ii) Expansion of the developing countries' export trade should be facilitated 
with a view to reducing or eliminating their external imbalances. To this effect: 
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- the developing countries would need to amplify and strengthen their export 
promotion policies, in relation both to traditional and to non-traditional exports; 
- the developed countries should reduce or eliminate the tariff and non-tariff 
barriers (especially sliding-scale tariffs) which affect their imports from develop-
ing countries; this step is indispensable for the success of the export promotion 
policies suggested in the previous subparagraph and also in order to make sure that 
the increases in export volumes achieved by virtue of tenacious efforts on the part 
of the developing countries in general, and those of Latin America in particular, 
are not nullified by a serious deterioration of the terms of trade; 
(iii) It would be necessary to reschedule the servicing of the developing 
countries' external debt while the world reactivation programme was gathering 
impetus. To that end it would be useful to place at the disposal of the countries 
a support mechanism for the refinancing of the debt, whose possible characteristics 
have been indicated in various CEPAL documents, and may be summed up as the right 
to automatic access to refinancing in accordance with certain objective indicators, 
and in the principle that the scale and terms of rescheduling must be decided case 
by case; 
(iv) The developed countries should devise measures relative to the inter-
national private banking system, such as the acceptance of mechanisms for longer-term 
refinancing of their portfolios; the transfer of the effects of these measures to 
heavily indebted countries would enable the latter to obtain some relief of their 
payments situation; 
(v) There would need to be a considerable increase in the operational levels 
(and also in some cases, in the types of operation) of multilateral financial 
institutions, in particular those of the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank, but in addition those of regional credit institutions. The present dimensions 
of the International Monetary Fund are absolutely insufficient to cope with the 
existing situation in respect of external disequilibria, and its usable resources 
run the risk of exhaustion during the first half of 1983. To prevent this, and to 
allow the Fund to play an active role in a non-depressive solution of the crisis, 
the scope of its operations should be enlarged by means of raising the member 
countries' subscriptions. It should be stressed that a hundred-per-cent increase 
in Monetary Fund subscriptions would mean adding from 30 000 to 40 000 million 
dollars to the Institution's total loan resources, and that these amounts represent 
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only a proportion ranging fran 10 to 15% of Latin America's current external debt. 
Lastly, the International Monetary Fund could establish a service for the.financing 
of external deficits in the developing countries caused, by increases in the inter-
national interest rates, as representatives of Latin American governments have been 
proposing for some months past, in various forums: 
(vi) Simultaneously, the resources of the World Bank and the regional banks, 
both those of a concessionary and those of a non-subsidized character, should be 
boosted, to enable these institutions to provide financial and technical support for 
changes in the structure of production which are indispensable not only in order to 
weather the present crisis but also to regain reasonable and steady world economic 
growth rates during the rest of the 1980s. The enlargements of funds proposed by 
the international public banking system would be. feasible, in the event of rapid 
and genuine fulfilment of the objectives consisting in the transfer to the developing 
countries of financial resources representing 0.7% and 1% of the industrialized 
countries' gross domestic product; 
(vii) Lastly, it would be necessary to introduce at the earliest possible 
moment a reform of the international monetary system making adequate provision at 
least for the bases and conditions for a process of equitable and symmetrical 
adjustment; for the creation of liquidity linked to the expansion of world trade 
flows; for the existence of a rlgime of flexible but relatively stable exchange 
rates; and for the satisfaction of the developing countries' needs, especially in 
respect of the transfer of monetary resources. Similarly needful is a reform of. 
the international system of trade making proper allowance for the interests of the 
developing countries. 
(b) South-South co-operation 
(i) Trends and potentialities. During the next few years the economic 
relations existing between the developing countries should be strengthened and 
amplified as a means of seeking new dynamic factors of-, growth and mitigating the 
harmful consequences of the slow development of the world economy. Increasing 
interregional co-operation would be superadded to intra-regional co-operation and 
to the expansion and reconstruction of the domestic market of the developing 
countries themselves, as a way of ensuring the Third World the more rapid rate of 
development which would permit of its insertion in an international economy 
dominated by the passive behaviour of the centres. Co-operation among the nations 
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of the different developing regions is part of the.quest for a new international 
economic order, and one of the essential elements in the International Development 
Strategy for the 1980s. 
In the 1970s the real potentialities of linkage between the countries of the 
South became apparent. These countries'will to reduce their dependence upon the 
centres and to deepen their own interdependence has been reflected in action on 
the part of countries or groups of countries whereby they have been able to get to 
know one another better, to improve communications and transport, to establish 
special financing mechanisms, to create joint enterprises, to execute technical 
co-operation projects including transfer and development of technologies of their 
own, and, of course, to achieve a significant expansion of reciprocal trade. 
The available background data on Latin America's trade with the rest of the 
developing countries suggest that during the rest of the 1980s an important and 
sustained expansion of interregional trade might take place. Between 1970 and 
1978 Latin America's exports to the other developing countries as a whole raised 
their share in the region's total exports from 2% to 5%. The latter figure still 
seems relatively low, and may be pushed up considerably in the course of the 1980s. 
This impression is corroborated by the fact that in relation to the total imports 
of the developing countries (excluding Latin America), Latin American exports to 
the countries in question represented only 1.4% in 1978, a coefficient similar to 
that recorded in 1970.9/ 
In turn, the outlook is promising for a considerable increase in the direct 
inflow of loans and investment from the developing countries of the OPEC to the 
non-petroleum-exporting countries of the Third World, a large number of which will 
be generating persistent balance-of-payments deficits on current account. In 
particular, there are possibilities of a future increase in loans and investment 
of this kind, and specific initiatives in this direction exist already. 
In another sphere, the experiences of Argentina and Brazil in co-operation 
with various African countries highlight the possibilities of collaboration in 
respect of technology. The "intermediate" technologies available in the Latin 
American countries for application in other developing countries are especially 
suitable, above all in comparison with those technologies which it is attempted 
9/ See in this connection CEPAL, "The External Economic Relations of Latin 
America in the 1980s", E/CEPAL/G. 1160, April 1981, pp. 147-148. 
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to transfer from the central countries. In 1982, the secretariats of the Economic 
Commission for Africa and the Economic Commission for Latin America launched a pro-
gramme of horizontal co-operation between the two regions, particularly in the fields 
of foreign trade, of development of human resources and of science and technology. 
(ii) Programme of action for South-South co-operation. The various aspects 
mentioned have led the developing countries to undertake a search in greater • 
depth for systematic forms of joint action. As a result of the Conference on 
Economic Co-operation among Developing Countries, held in Mexico City, in 1976; the 
United Nations Conference. on Technical Co-operation among Developing Countries, 
convened in Buenos Aires, in 1978; the Fourth Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 77, 
held at Arusha, in 1979; and the High-Level Cbnference of the Group of 77 which took 
place in Caraballeda, Venezuela, in 1981, a start has been made on various joint 
activities of Third World countries which have been reflected in orientations and 
decisions in several international forums, especially in United Nations agencies. 
These have not only given shape to guiding principles for the reciprocal co-operation 
of the developing countries but have also indicated priorities for action and specific 
mechanisms for putting it into effect. The will of the South to undertake further 
joint action was particularly clearly reflected in the Ministerial Meeting of the 
Group of 77 at Arusha, where a first Short and Medium-Term Action Plan for Global 
Priorities on Economic Co-operation among Developing Countries (ECDC) was adopted. 
In this it was established that reciprocal economic co-operation "is a key element 
in a collective self-reliant strategy and thus becomes both an essential part of and 
an instrument for the necessary structural changes required for a balanced and 
equitable process of world economic development, ushering in a new set of relation-
ships based on mutual interests and accommodations".10/ 
Among the areas of interest defined at the Mexico Conference, the First 
Action Plan adopted at Arusha selected 9 in which to adopt the first measures of 
reciprocal co-operation; a global system of trade preferences among developing 
countries (GSTP); co-operation among state-trading organizations (STOs); establish-
ment of multinational marketing enterprises (MMEs); strengthening of subregional, 
regional and interregional economic integration and co-operation; co-operation in 
10/ See UNCTAD, Arusha Programme for Collective Self-reliance and Framework 
for Negotiations, UNCTAD V, Document TD/236, Manila, May 1979, p. 8. 
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the transfer and development of technology; least developed countries; landlocked 
and island developing countries; monetary and financial co-operation; and multi-
national production enterprises among developing countries (MPEs). Furthermores 
during the Ministerial Meeting at Arusha it was reiterated that technical co-operation 
is a basic instrument for the promotion of economic co-operation among developing 
countries, for which reason it was considered necessary that the Plan of Action and 
the corresponding resolutions adopted at the United Nations Conference on Technical 
Co-operation among Developing Countries should be soon and effectively implemented. 
In view of the progress made to date, and of its paramount importance, special 
attention will be devoted here to the global system of trade preferences among 
developing countries. After the preparation of a number of technical studies by 
UNCTAD and the various meetings at the regional and world levels, the GST? has entered 
upon the stage of negotiation and progress in this respect during 1982 is promising. 
The bases approved by the developing countries define the framework within which 
negotiations leading to the establishment of the GSTP will be conducted. By virtue 
of the scope and significance of these agreed bases, the setting-up of the GSTP may 
lead to the creation of an authentic economic system for the developing countries, 
which would thus permit the strengthening of relations among the developing countries 
in respect of trade and in many other fields of economic activity. 
Lastly, it is of interest to note that at the Venezuela meeting in 1981, it 
was decided to set in motion a series of mechanisms (working groups, conferences, 
seminars) designed to strengthen co-operation among developing countries in the 
areas of energy, financing, agriculture, raw materials, technology, industrialization 
and trade. 

